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Logan: Presumption
NOTES of Death in Life Insurance Cases
PRESUMPTION OF DEATH IN LIFE
INSURANCE CASES
Society has long had to face the problems arising when one of
its members disappears. When a person who disappears is covered by
life insurance, questions immediately arise concerning the rights
of the beneficiary of the policy.1 Can he collect immediately?
Should he continue to pay the premiums? These questions hinge
on other questions. Is the insured dead, or presumed dead? If so,
when did he die, or when is he presumed to have died? The common
law developed the "presumption of death" doctrine 2 in an effort to
cope with the legal aspects of these problems. Most states, 3 including
Florida 4 have recognized the presumption by statute. It arises from
proof of seven years' unexplained absence of a person from his usual
place of residence and absence of communication with him.5 It
counters the common law "presumption of life" that one who is
shown to be alive at a given time is presumed to be alive at a subsequent time., In the absence of the presumption of death, the pre7
sumption of life continues indefinitely.
The initial problem that confronts the beneficiary of a life insurance policy upon the disappearance of the insured is to determine
when to assert the claim. He cannot take advantage of the presumption of death because the requisite seven years have not passed. If
the beneficiary relies upon the available evidence to establish that
the insured has met his death, and loses the case, the concept of res
judicata apparently bars him from asserting the claim at the termination of the seven-year period.8 Hence, when the beneficiary is in
doubt as to whether his evidence is sufficient to overcome the pre-

1. See generally Kimball, The Time of Presumed Death in Life Insurance
Disappearance Cases, 4 UTAH L. REv. 293 (1955); Roca, When Did Ulysses Die?,
23 GEo. WASH. L. Rv. 172 (1955); Note, 61 W. VA. L. REv. 298 (1959).
2. E.g., Burr v. Slim, 4 Whart. 150 (Pa. 1839); Redwine v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 178 Tenn. 83, 156 S.W.2d 389 (1941); Doe d. George v. Jesson, 6 East 80,
102 Eng. Rep. 1217 (K.B. 1805).
3. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 61, §§156-64 (1940); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§1701-12
(1953); Miss. CODE ANN. §1698 (1956); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §320.1201 (b) (1950).
4. FLA. STAT. §§734.32-.34 (1959). See also Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hamilton,
143 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1944) (applying Fla. law); Wilson v. Flemming, 172 F.
Supp. 123 (N.D. Fla. 1959); Johns v. Burns, 67 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1953).
5. See cases cited notes 2, 4 supra.
6. E.g., Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 107 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1939); Chapman v. Chapman, 59 Ga. App. 602, 1 S.E.2d 697 (1939); Seeds v. Grand Lodge,
A.O.U.W., 93 Iowa 175, 61 N.W. 411 (1894).
7. See Bennett v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 180 La. 238, 156 So. 290 (1934)

(civil law).
8. See Lesser v. New York Life Ins. Co., 53 Cal. App. 236, 200 Pac. 22 (1921).
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sumption of life, it seems that he would be well advised to wait seven
years before bringing an action. At that time he would be entitled
to an instruction that the insured is to be presumed dead.
Assume that the beneficiary determines that he cannot establish,
with reasonable certainty, that the insured is dead and decides that the
better course under the facts available is to wait for the period to
expire and use the presumption to establish the death. He may then
discover that there is another obstacle to his ultimate recovery. The
time of death may become critical. If the policy lapses during the time
required for the period to run and the beneficiary is unable to establish that the insured died before the policy lapsed, he will not be
permitted to recover. In some situations the cash reserve of the policy
will be sufficient to convert the policy into fully paid term insurance
of a sufficient duration to cover the period. 9 In situations in which the
period is not so covered and the beneficiary is unwilling or, as in the
case of the impoverished family, unable to pay the premium for the
period, recovery will be denied in the absence of proof fixing the
time of death as prior to the lapse.10
The law has developed four views concerning the time of death
of a missing person. The "Tisdale Doctrine" permits a presumption
of death to arise before the end of seven years. The missing person
in the case in which the doctrine arose" was a young man of good
repute who disappeared while in Chicago on a business trip. The
basis of this doctrine is that prosperous men of good character and
habits with affection for their families seldom voluntarily disappear
from sight. The second presumption is the "Specific Peril Doctrine."
Under this doctrine the presumption of death does not arise because
of the lapse of seven years but from proof of a shorter absence plus
evidence of exposure to specific peril.12 In reality this is not a presump9. This is the effect of a statute requiring life insurance policies to contain a

"non-forfeiture clause." See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §627.0225 (1959); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.

73, §841.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1960); IND. STAT. ANN. §39-4206b (Burns Supp.
1960); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §197 (Supp. 1959).
10. See Szabad 8: Blum, Proving Death of Victims of Nazi Oppression, 24
N.Y.U.L. REv. 577 (1949). The statute of limitations might appear to raise
similar problems, but the cases treating the problem hold that, in situations in
which the beneficiary must rely on the 7-year period to establish death, the cause
of action does not accrue until the period has expired and that the statute does
not begin to run until that time. United States v. Wilhite, 219 F.2d 343 (4th Cir.
1955); Howard v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 197 Wash. 230, 85 P.2d 253 (1938).
11. Tisdale v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 26 Iowa 170, 96 Am. Dec. 136

(1868).
12. Davie v. Briggs, 97 U.S. 628 (1878) (presumed decedent exposed to Indian
fighting); Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Tilton, 84 F.2d 10 (10th Cir. 1936);
Herold v. Prudential Ins. Co., 23 F. Supp. 424 (E.D. Pa. 1937), aff'd, 96 F.2d 996
(3d Cir. 1938).
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tion but recognition that death may be proved by circumstantial evidence. The third presumption, and the one most often followed, is that
unexplained absence for seven years raises a presumption of death but
does not raise a presumption that death occurred at any specific time
within the seven-year period. 1 3 The fourth presumption is that the
missing person is presumed to have died on the last day of the sevenyear period. 14 The rationale of this view is that since the presumption
of life is in force, the person cannot be presumed dead until the
presumption of life is rebutted.
The differences between these four presumptions are not as marked
as might appear. In order to prove the time of death under the
"Tisdale Doctrine," evidence may be used that does not directly tend
to show death.15 Under the "Specific Peril Doctrine," facts must be
shown indicating that the missing party was exposed to some specific
peril during his absence.' 6 Therefore, facts sufficient to show a
specific peril satisfy the requirements of the "Tisdale Doctrine." Under
the third view, that of no presumption as to time of death, proof of
exposure to specific peril is sufficient to establish death prior to the
end of the seven-year period. The presumption that death occurred
at the end of the period does not preclude the introduction of evidence
to show that the insured died at or near the time of his disappearance.' 7 Presumably this holds true even when the aid of the presumption is necessary to establish death initially. Under this presumption, evidence of exposure to a specific peril should also be
adequate to establish the time of death as before the end of the
seven-year period.
Thus it appears that evidence that would meet the requirements
of the "Specific Peril Doctrine" would also be sufficient to prove the
time of death under the other doctrines. Time of death would be least
difficult to prove under the "Tisdale Doctrine," since it is only necessary to show that it would be unlikely for the missing person to disappear without having met death.
15. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 143 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1944); National
Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ruffin, 237 Ala. 401, 187 So. 488 (1939); Kansas City Life Ins.
Co. v. Marshall, 84 Colo. 71, 268 Pac. 529 (1928); McKay v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 142 Mle. 296, 50 A.2d 914 (1947); Sherman v. Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
191 Minn. 607, 255 N.W. 113 (1934); Ligon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 219 S.C.
143, 64 S.E.2d 258 (1951).
14. United States v. O'Brien, 51 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1931); Edwards v. Equitable
Life Assur. Soc'y, 296 Ky. 448, 177 S.W.2d 574 (1944); Ferris v. American Ins. Union,
245 Mich. 548, 222 N.W. 744 (1929); Meyer v. Madreperla, 68 N.J.L. 258, 53 Atl.
477 (1902); Thompson v. Parrett, 52 Ohio App. 366, 78 N.E.2d 419 (1948).
15. Tisdale v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 26 Iowa 170, 96 Am. Dec. 136
(1868).
16. See cases cited note 12 supra.
17. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bancroft, 65 F.2d 963 (10th Cir. 1933); United States
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Claims by life insurance beneficiaries involving missing persons
have not come before the Florida courts. In Johns v. Burns8 the
conservator of the presumed decedent's estate sought to collect pension
benefits after the seven-year period. Two weeks after his disappearance
the decedent's car was found. His keys, fishing tackle, and outboard
motor were missing from it, and nothing was heard from him again.
The Florida Supreme Court upheld a finding that death occurred at
or near the time of his disappearance. Thus the conservator was not
entitled to recover pension benefits for the period from the disappearance until the suit. The Court discussed all four presumptions
and stated that they precluded neither a showing of specific peril nor
any other circumstances that would warrant the conclusion that death
occurred at an earlier time.
Although the Florida Supreme Court has not established the doctrine that it will follow in the insurance context, the Johns opinion
indicates that it will take a view favorable to the insurance beneficiary.
Regardless of the doctrine adopted, the burden of proving that death
occurred before the end of seven years is on the party who will be
benefited by this fact. In Johns the Court held that death may be
proved by facts raising a presumption of death, or by direct or circumstantial evidence. The Court also said that the time of death is
a fact to be proved as any other fact and may be established by circumstantial evidence.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in
a case involving an action on a life insurance policy, has thus stated
the Florida rule as to circumstantial evidence: 19
"'In civil cases the preponderance of evidence required,
where circumstantial evidence is relied on as the method of
proof, is a preponderance of all reasonable inferences that
might be drawn from the circumstances in evidence to prove
the principal fact sought to be established sufficient to outweigh all other contrary inferences.'"
The Court held that the question whether the insured was dead at
the time the policy lapsed was a question for the jury. The evidence
included establishment of the presumption of death arising from
seven years' absence. Another court has approved submitting to the
jury the question of date of death even when the evidence is circumstantial and shows no specific peril or impending or immediate
20
danger.
v. O'Brien, 51 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1931); Johns v. Burns, 67 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1953).
18. 67 So. 2d 765, 767 (Fla. 1953).
19. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 143 F.2d 726, 732 (5th Cir. 1944).
20. United States v. O'Brien, 51 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1931).
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